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OffshoreThis study examined accident reports (n = 23) for collisions between attendant vessels and offshore facil-
ities on the Norwegian continental shelf during the period of 2001–2011. An initial analysis indicated
that the concept of situation awareness (SA) might be useful for providing a more detailed understanding
of the processes that lead to collisions. SA is deﬁned as ‘being aware of what is happening around you and
understanding what that information means to you now and in the future’ (Endsley, 2012, p. 13). The ﬁrst
part of the study contains an analysis of accident reports that reveals that the collisions with offshore
facilities were preceded by loss of SA on the bridge in 18 of the 23 instances. Three types of SA errors were
identiﬁed: failure to perceive the situation correctly (Level 1 SA; n = 13), failure to comprehend the situ-
ation (Level 2 SA; n = 4), and failure to project the situation into the future (Level 3 SA; n = 1). In the sec-
ond part of the study, the human, technological and organisational factors described in the accident
reports are analysed to evaluate how the factors may have affected the duty ofﬁcers‘ awareness of the
situation. The results indicate that inadequate operation planning, inadequate bridge design, insufﬁcient
training, communication failures and distracting elements were the underlying factors that signiﬁcantly
contributed to the collisions.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction understand the human factors and processes that contributed toDuring the period of 2001–2011, a total of 27 collisions were
reported between attendant vessels1 and offshore facilities on the
Norwegian continental shelf. At least six of these collisions were
deemed to have very high hazard potentials (Kvitrud, 2011;
Oltedal, 2012). The catastrophic potential of collisions between
attendant vessels and offshore facilities was demonstrated in dra-
matic fashion by the Mumbai High North accident in July 2005. A
multipurpose support vessel lost control and hit several marine ris-
ers at the Mumbai High North offshore complex off the west coast of
India. The collision caused a gas leak that resulted in a serious ﬁre,
and parts of the complex collapsed after approximately two hours.
Of the 384 persons who were on board that day, 362 were rescued,
and 22 died (Daley, 2013). The objective of this study is tothe reported collisions on the Norwegian continental shelf to prevent
similar events in future. The analysis was based on the assumption
that to be effective, bridge crews on attendant vessels must act deci-
sively during stressful, high-risk situations. The analysis also
assumed that situation awareness (SA) is a prerequisite for quick
and good decisions (Endsley, 1995b). According to Endsley (2012,
p. 13), SA can be described as ‘being aware of what is happening
around you and understanding what that information means to you
now and in the future’. That is, the bridge crew must be able to iden-
tify key aspects of the environment accurately, understand the
meaning of what they sense, and have a good sense of what can hap-
pen. Although we have no data to verify that SA errors contributed to
the Mumbai High North accident, the available information strongly
suggests that a loss of SA might have been a contributing factor. The
weather conditions were unfavourable when the vessel approached
the offshore facility on its windward side. Due to technical problems,
the approach was initially made in manual mode and, subsequently,
in emergency mode, which indicates that the vessel’s position was
entirely under human control (Daley, 2013). In such conditions, it
is particularly important that the bridge crew is attentive and has
the ability to assess the situation continuously and act appropriately
to avoid severe consequences. Any collision between seagoing ves-
sels and ﬁxed installations, such as bridges and quays, has the
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nomic assets. However, as shown in the Mumbai High North case,
collisions with offshore production facilities have notably high haz-
ard potentials. In addition to the risk of injuries and fatalities, dam-
age to hydrocarbon pipes and subsequent ignition and ﬁre may
cause severe oil spills and thus represents a threat to marine life
and vulnerable ecosystems.
In the current study, we examined 23 of the 27 collisions that
occurred in the period from 2001 to 2011 to determine the role
of human errors that might have been related to the loss of SA.
However, because human error caused by the loss of SA can be per-
ceived as a consequence of the underlying circumstances in an
organisation (Reason, 1997), the current study also aimed to iden-
tify the human, technological and organisational factors that might
have inﬂuenced the bridge crews’ abilities to achieve and maintain
SA as the events unfold. The incidents that we analysed occurred
within a petro-maritime context in which various organisations
and actors, including both internal actors on board the vessel and
external actors (e.g., the offshore facility), interact on a daily basis.
However, our primary emphasis was on the bridge operations, and
our study is therefore limited to the course of events on the bridge.
To provide a frame of reference, we will brieﬂy outline the concept
of SA and suggest several factors that might have affected the
bridge crews’ SA formation.
1.1. The concept of situation awareness
According to Endsley (1995b), SA in bridge operations generally
involves three levels of information processing. At the ﬁrst level
(SA Level 1), the duty ofﬁcer perceives the status and dynamics
of the relevant elements in his/her environment. Given that our
attention and working memory capacities are limited and selective
(Simons, 2000), a typical error at this level would be the missing of
critical information. At the second level (SA Level 2), the duty ofﬁ-
cer will integrate and evaluate the information at hand. He/she is
required to understand the perceived information in relation to
the relevant goals and objectives. Because our attention and work-
ing memory capacities are limited, we rely on information stored
in our long-term memory in the form of particular mental models
(Endsley, 1995b). A mental model can be understood as ‘the mech-
anisms whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of system
purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and observed
system states, and predictions of future system states’ (Rouse and
Morris, 1986, p. 351). Thus, a typical error at the second level
would be a failure to comprehend the situation. The duty ofﬁcer
might misinterpret the information or experience limitations in
working memory due to information overload and/or stress
(Endsley, 2012). At the third level (SA Level 3), the duty ofﬁcer uses
his/her perception and comprehension of the current situation to
estimate what will happen in the near future (Endsley, 1995b).
For example, by calculating speed, currents and wind, the duty ofﬁ-
cer should be able to avoid a collision with an offshore facility by
reprogramming the automatic systems.
As proposed by Endsley, the three-level approach focuses on
cognitive processes and takes the mind of each individual as the
unit of analysis. However, this approach has certain limitations
in terms of our understanding of how SA is achieved in collabora-
tive systems. In this respect, a more recent perspective on SA pro-
vides an alternative manner in which to examine SA. Following
from the concept of distributed SA, SA is viewed as a system prop-
erty in which SA related information is distributed between differ-
ent agents (both human and non-human) in a collaborative
system. In this perspective, the focus of study is on the interactions
between the agents comprising the system, and a central aim is to
understand how SA-related information is transferred between dif-
ferent agents in day-to-day operations (Salmon et al., 2012). In thismanner, the application of a distributed SA perspective may
enhance our understanding of the factors that inﬂuence SA forma-
tion among the bridge crew. Communication is a particularly crit-
ical dimension that might be a source of misinformation and thus
affect a bridge crew’s SA requirements (Kanki, 2010; Patrick and
Belton, 2003; Weick et al., 1999). Should a crew member fail to
transfer information or communicate information in an ambiguous
manner, the bridge crew‘s SA formation might suffer (Endsley,
1995b). The technological environment of the bridge also provides
SA-related information; thus, man–machine interactions are of
particular importance on board offshore vessels. The extent to
which and how the technology provides the bridge crew with
information is therefore a critical dimension in the SA context
(Endsley, 2012). It has also been suggested that planning activities
aimed at anticipating events might have a positive effect on bridge
crews’ abilities to achieve SA. High-quality planning should ideally
improve the understanding of risk and enable crew members to
seek information in advance and plan for various scenarios
(Endsley and Robertson, 2000; Flin et al., 2008). Such planning
may be particularly important in situations in which the bridge
crew has limited time to act to avoid consequences. In addition
to highlighting interactions with both humans and the environ-
ment, Bolstad et al. (2005) emphasised that the operators’ abilities
are a central component in the formation of SA in collaborative sys-
tems. From this perspective, emphasis should be placed on factors
such as training regimes, including how the shipping companies
ensure that the bridge crew has sufﬁcient knowledge to under-
stand what they sense.
The loss of SA is frequently seen as an important contributing
factor to accidents in various industries, such as the aviation
(Endsley, 1995a; Jones and Endsley, 1996) and maritime industries
(Barnett et al., 2006; Grech et al., 2002). An accident analysis from
the offshore drilling industry indicates that the loss of SA is a sig-
niﬁcant antecedent of human error. Of the 135 cases that were
associated with a loss of SA, 67% were attributable to a lack of per-
ception of critical information (SA level 1), 20% were attributed to a
failure to comprehend the situation (SA level 2), and 13% were
attributed to an inability to project the situation into the near
future (SA level 3) (Sneddon et al., 2006). To the best of our knowl-
edge, no previous studies have examined the signiﬁcance of the
loss of SA during bridge operations on board offshore vessels.
1.2. International standards and industry guidelines
Several international standards and guidelines have been devel-
oped to support seafarers and help them operate safely at sea. The
oldest such standard is the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea that was developed by the International Maritime
Organization as a response to the Titanic disaster. This convention
was adopted in 1914 and was most recently revised in 2011. The
main objective of this convention is to specify minimum standards
for the construction of and equipment on board vessels. Of particu-
lar signiﬁcance in the SA context is the principle that bridge design
and the design of navigational systems and equipment should
enable the bridge crew to have convenient and continuous access
to essential information that is provided in a clear and unambigu-
ous manner (International Maritime Organization, 2012).
Furthermore, following a series of major accidents at sea in the
early 1990s, the International Maritime Organization began to
develop new regulations that account for human factors
(Gholamreza andWolff, 2008). This update included a new revision
of the Standard for Training, Certiﬁcation and Watch-Keeping
for Seafarers (International Maritime Organization, 2011) that
incorporated new minimum requirements for the training and
competence of seafarers and thus aimed to increase the knowledge
and skills of seafarers worldwide. This update also included a
Table 1
Type of vessels involved in the incidents.
Type of vessel No of incidents
Platform supply vessel 17
Anchor-handling vessel 2
Standby vessel 2
Shuttle tanker 1
Well stimulation vessel 1
Table 2
Type of operation being conducted at the times of the incidents.
Operation No of incidents
Loading/ofﬂoading 10
Approaching offshore facility 8
Departing from offshore facility 2
Anchor handling 2
Stand-by services 1
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(International MaritimeOrganization, 2010) that aimed to establish
a minimum standard for safety management systems (Rodriguez
and Champbell Hubbard, 1998–1999). However, because the code
sets out functional requirements, rather than speciﬁc operating
procedures, the industry is still relatively free to customise its
safetymanagement systems to its own needswithin the framework
of the code. A recent example is the North West European Area
(NWEA) guidelines for the safe management of offshore supply
and anchor-handling operations.2 These guidelines were developed
as a joint project bymaritime and offshore organisations in Denmark,
the Netherlands, the UK and Norway, and they were implemented in
2006. The purpose of these guidelines was to incorporate the best
practices in offshore supply and anchor-handling operations into
the industry (the North West European Area Guidelines, 2009).
Although the NWEA guidelines are ofﬁcially only recommendations,
in reality, clients require shipping companies that provide supply and
rig moving services to adhere to them. Several requirements that
were incorporated into the NWEA guidelines were intended to
increase the awareness of bridge crews of the situation and the
upcoming operations, for example, by mandating that two navigators
are on the bridge when operating inside the safety zone around an
offshore facility and by providing checklists and standards for risk
assessment that must be completed and met prior to entering the
safety zone. International standards and industry guidelines can thus
be seen as structured recommendations that are intended to assist
bridge crews in their work performance.
2. Methodology
2.1. Sample description
The objective of this study was to understand the human factors
and processes that contributed to the 27 collisions between atten-
dant vessels and offshore facilities on the Norwegian continental
shelf in the period of 2001 to 2011. The only available data about
these incidents are presented in reports from various investiga-
tions, and this study is based on reviews and analyses of the data
presented in these reports. Initially, we were able to collect reports
about 24 of the incidents, but one was excluded due to sparse
information. Three of the incidents included in this study were
investigated by more than one agency or organisation, resulting
in a total of 28 accident reports. In these three cases, the accident
reports dealing with the same accident provided richer sources of
information about the cases in question. However, the suggested
causes were not counted more than once. Ten reports originated
from operators, fourteen from shipping companies, two from con-
sulting ﬁrms in cooperation with shipping companies, one from
the owner of the offshore facility and one from the Norwegian
Petroleum Safety Authority. The reports varied in length from 4
to 63 pages, and the total number of pages including appendixes
was 701. Table 1 presents an overview of the types of vessels that
were involved in the incidents, and Table 2 provides an overview of
the types of operations that were being conducted at the times of
the incidents.
2.2. Procedure
The coding was quite a challenge because the reports were sur-
prisingly diverse in terms of their contents, structures and applied
methodologies. Indeed, the methodologies were only explicitly
described in seven of the reports. In the remaining 21 reports,2 The NWEA guidelines were replaced by Guidelines for Offshore and Marine
Operations (GOMO), which were implemented on the 1st of June 2014. However, the
NWEA guidelines were applicable at the time of the collisions included in this study.the methodologies used to arrive at the ﬁndings and conclusions
were unknown. However, all of the reports contained statements
about the original investigators beliefs regarding the causes of
the incidents. To select the most appropriate approach for analys-
ing the accident reports, these statements were initially reviewed
and organised into major topics. The results indicated that human
error (caused either directly by the bridge crew or by inadequate
responses to technical faults), technical faults and adverse weather
conditions emerged as the major causal categories, and causal cat-
egories were implicated both separately and in combination.
Twenty-one cases involved some type of human error, nine cases
involved some type of technical fault, and six cases involved
adverse weather conditions (e.g., heavy fog, swells and waves). In
eight cases, human error occurred in combination with a technical
fault, in ﬁve cases, human error occurred in combination with
adverse weather conditions, and in the remaining eight cases,
human error was identiﬁed as the sole direct cause.
Based on the initial processing of the reports, we decided to fol-
low an approach that remained open to organizational, technolog-
ical, individual factors and environmental force-related factors. The
second analytical step consisted of a process of open and axial cod-
ing (Neuman, 2006) and provided opportunities to develop cate-
gories that described the causal factors and to examine the
associations between categories. In this process, failures related
to ‘problem detection’ and ‘problem diagnosis’ emerged as two
major categories of human error that contributed to the incidents.
These categories were considered to be congruent with Level 1 and
Level 2 in Endsley’s (1995b) theory of situation awareness, and this
concept therefore emerged as a major topic of the study.
Initially, we intended to end the procedure after the second
step. However, due to the identiﬁed link between the categories
and the theory of SA, we decided to elaborate further on the signif-
icance of the loss of SA. Consequently, a further analysis focused
exclusively on the 21 cases in which the incidents were caused
by human error alone or in combination with weather conditions
or technical faults. The third analytical step therefore involved
the use of Jones and Endsley’s (1996) conceptual framework, which
classiﬁes and describes the sources of SA errors at each of the SA
levels, to reanalyse and reclassify the information about the causes
presented in the reports. In cases in which more than one SA error
was identiﬁed, we only coded the error that occurred closest in
time to the collision.
Because the previous analytical steps were not sufﬁcient to
understand why the losses of SA occurred, we decided to extend
the analysis to identify the contributing factors. In the fourth step,
each accident report was re-examined to identify the human, tech-
nological and organisational contributing causes associated with
Table 3
Consequences.
Severity
rating
Consequences No of
incidents
Minor Minor or no material damage to facility and/or vessel 15
Examples: minor damage to railing, antennas, fender
lists, bulk hoses and minor dents in bulwark
Severe Considerable material damage to facility and/or vessel 8
Examples: dents in shaft and bracing on the offshore
facility and dents in the vessels hull
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code, and the codes were later condensed into broad categories.
For example, ‘insufﬁcient risk assessment’, ‘inadequate use of the
pre-entry checklist’ and ‘insufﬁcient technical tests’ before the ves-
sels entered the offshore facilities’ safety zones were all cate-
gorised as ‘planning failure’. In addition to ‘planning failure’,
‘inadequate design’, ‘communication failure’, ‘distracting elements’
and ‘insufﬁcient training’ emerged as major categories.
Finally, to increase the reliability of the coding, the reports were
independently analysed and classiﬁed (according to the SA concep-
tual framework) by two of the authors. Both authors remained
blind to the other’s classiﬁcations during this process. The raters
agreed in the majority of the cases. In cases of disagreement, the
raters discussed the cases and reached agreement by clarifying
and explaining their positions. In all but two cases, the raters
reached agreement about their classiﬁcations. For these two cases,
a third rater analysed and classiﬁed the accident reports. The ﬁnal
classiﬁcations were in accordance with the classiﬁcations of the
majority. The two cases in question are marked with asterisks (⁄)
in Table 5.2.3. Methodological challenges
As noted in previous studies that have analysed accident
reports, the present study contains limitations and shortcomings
concerning the ability to represent all aspects of an incident; ‘[all
such reports] are – even the best of them – a highly selective version
of the actuality, and it is also very much a subjective process’ (Reason,
2008, p. 58). Although the accuracy of a report can never be known
with any degree of certainty, it is important to identify the condi-
tions that might have led to inaccuracy (Scott, 1990). As previously
noted, the accident reports were surprisingly diverse in terms con-
tent, structure, and applied methodology. Although some of the
reports contained a relatively comprehensive analysis, it should
be noted that some of the reports contained rather sparse informa-
tion beyond the acute phase of the incident and emphasised tech-
nical faults and human error. Therefore, it is likely that the
organisational contributing causes were underrepresented in the
sample. Thus, the distribution of contributing causes might be
somewhat distorted relative to the actual distribution. Because
the methodologies applied in the investigations were not explicitly
described in the majority of the reports, it is also difﬁcult to assess
whether and how various SA aspects were covered in the investi-
gations. In addition to the arguments outlined above, an important
question is whether the researchers were able to draw the correct
conclusions based on the data presented in the accident reports.
Although the data utilised in this study consists of the investiga-
tors’ descriptions of the incidents and their beliefs regarding the
causes of the incidents, the coding process always includes subjec-
tive judgements. For example, in the present study, failures to
apply the mandatory checklists before the vessels entered the off-
shore facilities’ 500-m safety zones were coded as ‘planning fail-
ures’. Another code that might have been applicable in these
cases is ‘procedure violation’, which would have communicated
another aspect of the causal picture. However, we attempted to
established transparency in this study such that the description
of the incidents and associated contributing factors are presented
as narrative text to a large extent. The reader must however bear
in mind that the reliability of this study might be affected by the
aforementioned conditions.3 In one of the cases the vessel collided with the offshore facility at a speed of
9.7 knots.
4 In nine cases, whether the wave height was measured as signiﬁcant or maximum
wave height was not speciﬁed. In four cases, wave height was signiﬁcant wave height,
and in three cases, it was measured as maximum wave height.3. Results
The cases included in our study varied in relative severity, both
in terms of actual consequences and loss potential. The majority ofthe cases (n = 15) involved minor impacts with the offshore facility
and limited to minor material damage to the offshore facility
and/or vessel. Typical scenarios in these cases were that the vessel
drifted into the offshore facility due to technical problems or due to
inattentiveness by the bridge crew. Thus, in these cases, relatively
low amounts of force were involved. Additionally, the bridge crews
were able to restore normal states by pulling out from the offshore
facility relatively swiftly. The remaining cases (n = 8) were
assessed either by the Norwegian Safety Petroleum Authority or
the service provider as having severe loss potentials. In these cases,
the vessels hit the offshore facility at relatively high speeds3 or
made contact with the offshore facility repeatedly due to problems
pulling out from the offshore facility and restore a normal state.
Table 3 provide some examples of the actual consequences accord-
ing to severity rating.
According to the accident reports, the wind speeds were at calm
and high wind, moderate gale, and near gale levels at the times of the
incidents. However, no information about wind speed was avail-
able in three of the accident reports. In two other reports, the wind
speeds were described as light and thus could not be classiﬁed
according to Beaufort’s scale. The wave heights at the times of
the incidents according to the accident reports were between zero
and six metres.4 However, in three of the accident reports, no infor-
mation about wave height was available. In two other reports, the
conditions were described as calm seas. An overview of the weather
conditions at the times of the incidents is provided in Table 4.
SA errors were identiﬁed in 18 of the 21 cases we analysed.
Table 5 provides an overview of the classiﬁcations of these 18 cases
according to Jones and Endsley’s (1996) conceptual framework.
Thirteen incidents were classiﬁed as Level 1 errors, four cases were
classiﬁed as Level 2 errors, and one case was classiﬁed as a Level 3
error. Regarding the SA Level 1 errors, the most common source
was a ‘failure to monitor or observe data’, which was applicable
in 8 of the 13 cases. The most common source of the Level 2 errors
was a ‘lack of/poor mental model’, which was applicable in all four
cases. The incident classiﬁed as a Level 3 error was due to a failure
to project the possible consequences of a particular manoeuvre
when the vessel was about to leave the offshore facility. In twelve
of the cases, the bridge crew failed to perceive or comprehend crit-
ical information regarding the vessel’s technical status.
Table 6 provides an overview of contributing causes that were
associated with each source of SA error according to Jones and
Endsley’s (1996) conceptual framework. The column on the left
shows the numbers of incidents associated with each source of
SA error as presented in Table 5. The remaining columns show
the numbers of cases associated with each category of contributing
cause as identiﬁed in our analysis.
Overall, ‘planning failure’ was identiﬁed as the most common
contributing cause and was applicable in 10 of the 18 cases. The
Table 4
Weather conditions.
Wind speed Wave height Number of incidents
Fresh breeze – high wind, moderate gale, near gale (17–33 knot) 0–4 m 7
Fresh breeze – high wind, moderate gale, near gale (17–33 knot) 1.5–6 m 11
Fresh gale – hurricane (34 knot–P64 knot) N/A 0
Described as light wind Described as calm sea 2
Information not available Information not available 3
Table 5
Sources of SA errors according to Jones and Endsley’s (1996) conceptual framework.
Level of error No of incidents
Level 1 error – perception 13
Failure to monitor or observe data 8⁄
Hard to discriminate or detect data 1
Data not available 2
Misperception of data 2
Memory loss 0
Level 2 error – comprehension 4
Lack of/poor mental model 4
Use of incorrect mental model 0
Over-reliance on default values 0
Other 0
Level 3 error – projection 1
Lack of or incomplete mental model 0
Over-projection of current trends 0
Other 1
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tion failure’ and ‘insufﬁcient training’, which occurred in seven of
the 18 cases. ‘Planning failure’ in combination with ‘failure to mon-
itor or observe data’ was identiﬁed as the most common contribut-
ing cause among the SA Level 1 errors and was applicable in ﬁve of
eight cases. The most common contributing cause among the SA
Level 2 errors was ‘insufﬁcient training’ associated with ‘lack
of/poor mental model’, which was applicable in all four cases. In
the following sections, we elaborate on our ﬁndings and provide
examples drawn from the accident reports in accordance with
the structure provided by Jones and Endsley’s (1996) conceptual
framework.
3.1. Level 1 error – perception
3.1.1. Failure to monitor or observe data
In eight cases, the source of the SA error was the bridge crew’s
failure to monitor or observe critical available information. In ﬁve
of these cases, the bridge crew failed to detect settings in the ves-
sel’s technical system. Notably, two cases followed an almost iden-
tical course of events in that they were both caused by the bridgeTable 6
Contributing causes associated with sources of SA errors.
Sources of SA errors Contributing causes
Inadequate design Planning failur
Level 1 error – perception (n = 13)
Failure to monitor or observe data (n = 8) 2 5
Hard to discriminate or detect data (n = 1) 1 0
Data not available (n = 2) 1 1
Misperception of data (n = 2) 1 2
Level 2 error – comprehension (n = 4)
Lack of/poor mental model (n = 4) 2 1
Level 3 error – projection (n = 1)
Other (n = 1) 0 1
Total 7 10crew believing that the vessel was on manual steering when it was
actually on autopilot. Because the autopilot overrides manual
steering, all attempts to steer the vessel failed, which led to
unavoidable impact with the offshore facility. After one of the inci-
dents, the investigators stated, ‘he [the ofﬁcer] checked critical func-
tions (. . .) but he did not check the status of the autopilot’ (Report no
I06 – D01, p. 8). The last three cases were due to insufﬁcient mon-
itoring of the vessel’s relative distance to the offshore facilities. In
one of the accident reports, it was noted that ‘both the master and
the ﬁrst ofﬁcer were present on the bridge on [name of the vessel]
when the vessel was within the 500-m safety zone of [name of the
installation], but for a while, no one kept lookout in the vessel’s longi-
tudinal direction’ (Report no I15-D02, p. 15) (translated from
Norwegian into English). When the bridge crew’s attention was
ﬁnally drawn to the longitudinal direction, it was too late to
reverse the situation because the vessel was critically close to
the offshore facility.
The investigators emphasised what has been classiﬁed as ‘plan-
ning failure’ as the most common contributing cause associated
with the ‘failure to observe or monitor data’, which was applicable
in ﬁve of the eight cases. In three of these ﬁve cases, more active
use of the available checklists during the planning stage before
the vessel entered the offshore facility’s safety zone might have
helped the bridge crew to perceive critical data from the vessel’s
technical system. The second most common contributing causes
associated with ‘failure to monitor or observe data’ were ‘commu-
nication failure’ and ‘distracting elements’, which were both appli-
cable in four of the eight cases. Regards ‘communication failure’,
two cases were related to ambiguities in communication during
the transfer of command. In one of these cases, the ambiguity in
communication led to confusion about who was actually in com-
mand of the vessel. The investigators stated that ‘the master was
of the opinion that the ﬁrst ofﬁcer was in command of the vessel
(. . .). The master did not monitor the vessel’s position, while the ﬁrst
ofﬁcer took it for granted that the master was in control and command
of the vessel’ (Report no I09-D01, pp. 12–14). That no one was in
command resulted in an unmonitored approach to the offshore
facility. Regarding ‘distracting elements’, these elements stemmed
from incoming telephone calls, the performance of administrative
tasks and distractions due to other activities on deck. Thesee Communication failure Distracting elements Insufﬁcient training
4 4 3
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 4
0 1 0
7 6 7
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to the navigational activities.
3.1.2. Hard to discriminate/detect data
One of the incidents included in our study was caused by the
bridge crew’s difﬁculty in detecting critical information because
the vessel was moving between offshore facilities in the dark and
in heavy fog. Due to the visibility conditions, the crew failed to
detect one of the offshore facility’s legs, which resulted in a minor
impact.
The investigators emphasised both factors that were classiﬁed
as ‘inadequate design’ and ‘distracting elements’ as potential con-
tributing causes of the incident. Firstly, regarding design issues, it
was noted that due to the shape of the bridge, the bridge crew
was not able to see parts of the offshore facility from the manoeu-
vring position. Additionally, it was noted that the legs of the off-
shore facilities were painted a dark colour that was difﬁcult to
discern in reduced visibility conditions. Secondly, regarding ‘dis-
tracting elements’, the accident report stated that a moment of
inattention by the master due to VHF communication contributed
to the incident.
3.1.3. Data not available
In two cases, critical information concerning the state of the
vessel’s technical system from the bridge was not accessible (in
due time). In one of the cases, a technical fault in one of the thrus-
ters was a contributing cause to the incident, but because the joy-
stick manoeuvring system did not have a system for monitoring
the individual movements of the thrusters, the bridge crew
received no failure warning before beginning to position the vessel
close to the offshore facility. The other case was related to faulty
settings in the dynamic positioning5 (DP) system. A mishap that
occurred while making adjustments to the DP system resulted in a
situation in which the joystick’s references regarding forward and
stern were switched relative to the expectations of the bridge crew.
There were no indicators available on the bridge that could have
informed the crew about this faulty setting at the time of the
incident.
According to the investigators, ‘inadequate design’ was a con-
tributing cause of the ﬁrst incident because there was reason to
believe that the incident could have been prevented if the design
of the technical system had supported the information needs of
the bridge crew regarding the status of the thruster. In the second
incident, the investigators highlighted what were classiﬁed as a
‘planning failure’ and a ‘communication failure’ as contributing
causes. The accident report states that it was common procedure
on board the vessel to test all functions of the DP system before
the vessel enters an offshore facility’s safety zone. Thus, although
the functions were not tested, after making adjustments to the
DP, the bridge crew could have detected the faulty settings in
the planning stage if the mandatory test of the DP had been
performed. However, the adjustments to the DP were performed
in cooperation with the DP manufacturer, who helped the bridge
crew with the software via phone. In this context, the investigators
noted that the communication between the involved parties,
particularly the information received from the manufacturer, was
not sufﬁcient.
3.1.4. Misperception of data
Two of the cases were related to misperceptions of available
information. In the ﬁrst case, the bridge crew assessed the current
direction as be northeast, but it was actually southwest. In the5 DP is an advanced automated manoeuvring system that is based on positioning
reference systems such as global positioning systems.investigators’ view, this misperception played an important role
in the course of the events. In the other case, the vessel approached
the offshore facility on autopilot, and all attempts to steer the ves-
sel manually failed. According to the investigators, the duty ofﬁcer
stated that he performed a functional test of the rudders prior to
entering the safety zone and that he was convinced that the rud-
ders were working in manual mode. However, this perception
proved incorrect.
In the ﬁrst case, both ‘communication failure’ and ‘planning fail-
ure’ might have contributed to the bridge crew’s misperceptions.
Regarding the ‘communication failure’, the accident report high-
lighted that the previous shift had kept the vessel outside of the
safety zone for a while and would have had information about
the current conditions, but this information was not transferred
during the shift changeover. The investigators also noted that
according to standard procedure, the weather conditions, including
how the current is affecting the positioning of the vessel, should be
assessed approximately 50 m away from the offshore facility.
Because this assessment was not performed, the bridge crew
missed an opportunity to reassess the perceived current conditions
while planning the approach to the offshore facility. In the second
case, the ‘planning failure’ might have contributed to the incident
because the investigators emphasised that the technical systems
were not checked before entering the safety zone in accordance
with the vessel’s procedures.3.2. Level 2 errors – comprehension
3.2.1. Lack of/poor mental model
In the four cases that were classiﬁed as SA Level 2 errors, the
bridge crews perceived critical information but failed to compre-
hend its meaning. All four cases are believed to have been caused
by a ‘lack of or poor mental models’, and all of these incidents were
related to a type of miscomprehension of the status of the vessel’s
technical system. One of the incidents occurred when the vessel’s
DP was activated during a loading/ofﬂoading operation alongside
an offshore facility. Due to a known failure in a computer card,
one of the propeller units was deselected in the DP. Although the
redundancy requirements for the DP operation were not met, the
bridge crew decided to perform the operation because they
thought it would be sufﬁcient to use the deselected propeller unit
as a manual backup. At some point, the DP reference systems were
lost, and the vessel began to drift towards the offshore facility. In
an attempt to reverse the situation, the bridge crew attempted to
stop the movement by utilising the deselected propeller unit while
the vessel’s DP system was still activated. As a consequence of
operating the system in this manner, a strong force that the DP sys-
tem was not aware of was introduced. Consequently, the vessel
continued to drift towards the offshore facility with the DP system
activated, while the manual use of the deselected propeller unit
caused a strong rotation that led the forepart of the vessel to col-
lide with the offshore facility. According to the investigators,
‘Apparently, the crew were not aware of the risk involved and the
effect of operating with the system conﬁgured as it was’ (Report
I08-D01, p. 12).
‘Insufﬁcient training’ was believed to be a common contributing
cause in all four of the cases that were associated with ‘lack of/poor
mental models’. Two of the accident reports highlighted relatively
comprehensive deﬁciencies in training. For example, in the case
outlined above, the investigators stated that ‘no systematic training
was given in handling the vessel or training on a simulator, despite
several of the navigators having no experience of this DP control sys-
tem, limited or no experience in the handling and use of diesel electric
propulsion, and operations close to offshore installations’ (Report no
I08-D01, p. 18).
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3.3.1. Other
One case in our sample was classiﬁed as an SA Level 3 error,
indicating that the bridge crew failed to project future states. In
this case, the duty ofﬁcer was positioning the vessel using the joy-
stick control. When the loading operation commenced, the vessel
was not in a stable position and was still drifting towards the off-
shore facility. At approximately the same time that the crane hook
was disconnected from the deck load, the duty ofﬁcer noticed that
the gyro repeater had lost its signal, and he therefore decided to
switch from joystick to manual control to pull back from the off-
shore facility. However, because the vessel was still drifting
towards the facility, he failed to project the consequences of his
counter manoeuvre. Consequently, the stern drifted towards the
offshore facility and made contact with one of its legs.
‘Distracting elements’ and ‘planning failure’ were identiﬁed as
contributing causes in the incident. It was noted in the accident
report that a possible contributing factor to the incident was the
fact that the duty ofﬁcer was distracted by the gyro repeater.
Additionally, the report highlighted that the vessel should have
been, but was not, in a stable position before the loading operation
commenced.4. Discussion
The present study presents a comprehensive analysis of the col-
lisions between attendant vessels and offshore facilities on the
Norwegian continental shelf over a 10-year period. Our primary
aim was to determine the role of SA in these collisions. The results
indicated that SA errors likely have preceded the collisions in 18 of
the 21 cases. In this context, SA errors should not be confused with
decision errors because the duty ofﬁcers believed that they had
made the right decisions based on their perceptions and assess-
ments of the situations. However, due to inadequate situational
assessment, as judged by the subsequent collisions or signiﬁcant
breaches of safety barriers, their actions were demonstrated to
be wrong.
Notably, 12 of the 18 cases associated with SA errors were
related to the vessel’s technical status, e.g., missing critical infor-
mation regarding the vessel’s steering mode or deﬁcient compre-
hension related to the status of the technical system. These
ﬁndings may not be surprising because the bridge crew’s duties
on board attendant vessels largely involve operating and monitor-
ing technology. In this context, it is notable that in the last decade,
the overall technical system in the bridge has developed towards
increased automation (e.g., electronic maps and dynamic position-
ing systems) with the intention of improving operational efﬁciency
and safety (Dekker, 2005; Lee and Moray, 1994). However, the
bridge crew still plays a crucial role in the control of these systems.
For example, DP keeps the vessel in a ﬁxed position that is consis-
tent with the bridge crew’s programming of the system. However,
the bridge crew needs to monitor parameters, respond to alarms
and diagnose failures to maintain safe operations alongside the off-
shore facilities. Such activities can be taxing, and automation may
therefore provide the illusion of a reduced workload while, in real-
ity, increasing the workload (Bhardwaj, 2013). In contrast to the
tasks entrusted to the automatic systems, those entrusted to the
bridge crew rely on demanding cognitive processes, such as sus-
tained attention, perception and diagnostic skills. In this context,
it is also signiﬁcant that automation often adds to the complexity
of a system, which in turn, can cause human performance prob-
lems. Perrow (1999) took a rather deterministic stand when he
claimed that accidents are unavoidable in systems that are charac-
terised by complex interactions and tight couplings. Accidents arebound to happen due to characteristics such as a limited under-
standing of the system, indirect information from the monitors
and alarms, time-dependent processes and little room for error
in the system. One of the main problems of complex systems is
that they challenge the operator’s ability to form reliable mental
models of how the system works (Endsley, 2012; Parasuraman
and Riley, 1997). Complexity may consequently slow the ability
to detect a failure or other important information. Furthermore,
complexity challenges the operator’s ability to comprehend the
information correctly and project future states. Although vessels
using DP in close proximity to the offshore facilities have built-in
technical redundancy, there is little room for error if the technol-
ogy fails because the time that is available for a response is notably
limited. In such situations, it is of the utmost importance that all
failures are detected early and correctly diagnosed and that the
crew acquires manual control when necessary.
Our analysis identiﬁed six sources of SA errors among which
‘failure to monitor or observe data’ associated with SA Level 1
errors was the most common source of failure. These results are
in line with similar studies from the aviation (Jones and Endsley,
1996), offshore (Sneddon et al., 2006) and marine transport
(Grech et al., 2002) industries that have also indicated that most
common types of SA failures are related to situations in which all
of the information are available, but that information is not per-
ceived by those involved. In this context, it is notable that the num-
ber of items of equipment at the main workstation increased from
22 to 40 during the period of 1990 to 2006 (Lützhöft et al., 2006).
Correspondingly, on a randomly selected offshore vessel, the DP
operator is required to retrieve information from 6 monitors and
17 control panels of varying sizes at the DP station, which requires
the switching of attention between various computer systems
while also attending to the surrounding environment. Therefore,
there is a risk of missing critical information. Organisational redun-
dancy might also be a factor that should be considered in this
respect. Redundancy in the form of manning the bridge with two
navigators while operating inside an offshore facility’s safety zone
would in principle facilitate safety because the ofﬁcers could mon-
itor each other and raise critical questions (Rosness, 2001).
However, there is evidence from our sample that the implementa-
tion of this principle could have both positive and negative effects.
Failures to clarify the division of labour could lead to incorrect
assumptions about who is responsible for speciﬁc tasks, which in
turn, could lead to insufﬁcient monitoring of critical information.
Finally, in recognition of the limitations of a solely SA-centred
approach, our ﬁnal aim in this study was to examine whether
human, technological and organisational factors might have
affected the bridge crews’ abilities to achieve and maintain SA. In
our analysis, we divided the contributing causes into ﬁve cate-
gories and found that ‘planning failure’ was the most signiﬁcant
factor overall. In the planning phase, the bridge crew is required
to retrieve information from various sources to decide on the most
favourable approach and positioning of the vessel alongside the
offshore facility. Among others, these information sources include
weather forecasts, personnel from the offshore facilities and tech-
nical equipment on board the vessel. Therefore, it is important that
the bridge crew pays attention in the planning phase to obtain the
necessary SA for operation. A majority of the cases associated with
‘planning failure’ can be regarded as incidences of procedural vio-
lations. According to the shipping companies’ safety management
systems and the NWEA guidelines, the bridge crews are supposed
to use checklists that contain items such as the status of the ves-
sel’s technical system, weather conditions and communication
lines prior to entering an offshore facility’s safety zone. Although
checklists do not contain SA information per se, they contain items
that are meant to ensure that the important SA information is
retrieved and considered during the planning phase. In this
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SA prior to entering an offshore facility’s 500-m zone. However,
when failures to comply with mandatory checklists are observed,
it is necessary to understand why the procedural violations
occurred and not simply ascertain that they have occurred
(Dekker, 2005). Although the accident reports included in our
study seldom provided explanations in this context, research sug-
gests several potential explanations. For example, Rasmussen
(1997) highlighted that factors such as production pressure and
individual motivation to exert less effort may lead to violations
of safety procedures. Dekker (2005) also emphasised that procedu-
ral violations can be viewed as sensible actions overall when the
pressures and trade-offs that exist in what he calls ‘real work’
are considered. Moreover, an important factor for ensuring compli-
ance with procedures is that the procedures are perceived to be
practicable and meaningful by the bridge crew, or as Reason
(2008, p. 58) phrased it, ‘attitudes and beliefs leading to
non-compliance are only half the problem. The other half, or more,
arises from bad procedures’.
Regarding the SA Level 2 errors, ‘insufﬁcient training’ was iden-
tiﬁed as the most signiﬁcant contributing cause. Because human
working memory has a very limited capacity, we tend to rely on
mental models that are stored in our long-term memory during
the processing of information. Well-developed mental models are
created from training and experience and can inﬂuence an opera-
tor’s ability to achieve SA at all levels (Endsley, 1995b). In the cur-
rent study, insufﬁcient training was primarily associated with the
SA Level 2 errors that were caused by ‘lack of or incomplete mental
models’ related to the vessels’ technical systems. In general, a fairly
large proportion of the maritime training regime consists of
on-board training in the sense that senior ofﬁcers train the cadets
and junior ofﬁcers on board their vessels. However, it is notable in
this context that a lack of equipment standardisation appears to be
characteristic of the maritime industry. For example, different ves-
sels of the same type in a shipping company’s ﬂeet can be equipped
with devices from different manufacturers, and these differences
can entail signiﬁcant differences in man–machine interfaces.
Autopilot can serve as a simple example. Attempts to steer a vessel
manually when the autopilot is activated can have the following
consequences: (a) no signals other than the autopilot button indi-
cate that the autopilot is activated, (b) control is automatically
transferred to manual steering after a few seconds, or (c) an alarm
sounds to indicate that the autopilot is activated. This lack of stan-
dardisation means that retraining and practice are of the utmost
importance whenever an ofﬁcer is transferred to a different vessel
(Grech et al., 2008). If such training and practice does not occur, the
ofﬁcer might work based on a simpliﬁed mental model and thereby
be vulnerable to SA errors.5. Conclusions
Several studies have reported that the loss of SA is a signiﬁcant
factor in incidents and accidents that are associated with human
error (Endsley, 1995a; Grech et al., 2002; Jones and Endsley,
1996). In this respect, our ﬁndings conﬁrm earlier research in that
18 of 21 cases associated with human error may involve the loss of
SA. Our study further suggests that ‘inadequate design’, ‘planning
failure’, ‘communication failure’, ‘ distracting elements’ and ‘insuf-
ﬁcient training’ may have been signiﬁcant contributing factors to
the incidents. These ﬁndings are perhaps not surprising because
the avoidance of these factors is an important precondition for
the safe operation of any system. However, this study demon-
strated how these factors might have inﬂuenced the SA of the
bridge crews during the courses of the events. In so doing, this
study examined the contributing factors from the perspective ofthe potential consequences on SA rather than as general weak-
nesses in the system. To our knowledge, no previous studies of
accident reports have examined the roles of contributing factors
related to the loss of SA in accidents and incidents.
Extensive SA-related research has been performed over several
decades. However, whether these research efforts have actually led
to improvements in the industry has been questioned (Salmon and
Stanton, 2013). In this context, the present study will hopefully
have practical implications for the petro-maritime industry
because it identiﬁed some potential areas for improvement. Most
notably, errors due to reduced vigilance and misconceptions of
the technical automation systems emerged as the primary antece-
dents of collisions. In this context, Endsley (2012) recommended
design principles that are believed to support SA in man–machine
interactions. To create technological environments that support
the SA needs of bridge crews, the industry should provide for
design processes that are driven by SA theory in both new builds
and modiﬁcations of existing vessels in the ﬂeet. Overall, ‘inade-
quate planning’ was identiﬁed as the most common contributing
cause. This ﬁnding is important because it might have direct prac-
tical implications for the shipping industry such as revising exist-
ing procedures for planning activities and/or ensuring that bridge
crews comply with existing procedures. The current study also
revealed that ‘insufﬁcient training’ was the most common con-
tributing cause associated with failure to comprehend or assess
the situation at hand. Because well-developed mental models
come from experience and training (Endsley, 1995b), it is of the
utmost importance that shipping companies adopt procedures that
ensure that sufﬁcient on-board training is provided in addition to
training on navigation simulators. Due to the lack of standardisa-
tion of technical equipment, these procedures should provide suf-
ﬁcient overlap periods and training whenever an ofﬁcer is
transferred to a new vessel in a shipping company’s ﬂeet.
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